By Javier Corrales.
The New York Times. January 1,
2001
WASHINGTON -- Today the Cuban regime celebrates its 42nd anniversary. Soon
it will mark another milestone: surviving nine American presidents without
showing any signs of democratization. Will the Cuban regime remain unchanged
through the administration of another American president? The answer depends on
the conservatives both in Cuba and in the United States.
The resistance of the Cuban system to political reform is remarkable. In the
1990's, Fidel Castro's government faced what would seem to be inexorable
pressure for reform: the extinction of its patron (the Soviet bloc), the
collapse of its economy (a 40 percent contraction from 1989 to 1994), an
avalanche of Western tourists reminding Cubans of their deprivation, declining
labor productivity and a historic papal admonition. And yet, the regime endures.
The longevity of the United States embargo against Cuba is similarly
remarkable. Although embargoes against tyrannies are customary in American
foreign policy, those that last four decades, as this one has, are rare. It has
survived despite mounting political pressure against it in the 1990's. Pressure
now comes in part from groups dear to Republican interests: agribusinesses,
biotechnology companies, financial firms and even some Cuban-American groups in
Florida. A proposal to create a bipartisan commission to review the embargo was
signed by 24 senators, including 16 Republicans, but this initiative failed, and
the embargo survived.
In the face of pressure to liberalize in the early 1990's, Mr. Castro sought
the support of the most risk-averse, die-hard members of the ruling party, the
duros, who hated glasnost and perestroika when those ideas were in vogue in the
Soviet world. His decision to side with the duros has left Cuban politics frozen
in time.
The American government's response to Cuba over the past four decades has
remained similarly tough. President Clinton has softened the embargo by
increasing people-to- people contacts, and Congress approved limited sales of
food and pharmaceuticals to Cuba this year. But these changes in policy have not
weakened the resolve of conservatives in Congress who support the ongoing
embargo. In fact, many embargo supporters are convinced that efforts to draw
Cuba out of its isolation, like Canada's policy of increasing business ventures
and Latin America's policy of diplomatic inclusion, have failed. They rightly
point out that the Cuban regime has become more repressive since 1994.
President-elect George Bush may feel it would be politically difficult to
press for liberalization of this policy. After all, the costs of forgoing normal
relations with Cuba are not high. Neither our economy nor our national security
will improve significantly by normalized ties with Cuba. The seemingly low
geopolitical value of Cuba, together with Mr. Bush's own desire to shore up his
conservative support, could cause him to leave Cuba policy to the conservatives
of his party.
Yet one can imagine a different outcome. Mr. Bush could tell his
conservative allies that change was inevitable, that if he did not sponsor it,
the business and humanitarian groups pushing to end the embargo would yield more
than necessary.
Rather than a full repeal of the embargo which would amount to an
excessive accommodation to a dictatorship Mr. Bush could push for repeal
of the 1966 Helms-Burton law, which toughened the embargo in two regrettable
ways. First, it internationalized the embargo by allowing the United States to
penalize foreign companies for operating properties in Cuba that had been
previously owned by Americans. Second, it shifted power to alter the embargo
from the president to Congress. This policy is unnecessarily irritating to our
allies and unwisely reduces the power of the executive branch now in
Republican hands over foreign policy.
Returning control over the embargo to the White House could give Mr. Castro
and the duros incentive to negotiate with Mr. Bush. The result might be an
exchange of concessions, and perhaps the beginnings of real political reform.
Mr. Bush should argue to Congressional conservatives that his administration is
more likely to outsmart the Castro regime than a divided and
interest-group-dominated Congress. He might even remind them of Richard Nixon's
policy of engagement with China, which conservatives now consider one of their
smartest moves during the cold war.
Mr. Bush has a chance to break with the past. He has the conservative
credentials to alter Cuba policy, and perhaps the vision to do it.
Javier Corrales is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and an assistant
professor of political science at Amherst College.
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company |