Sebastian A. Arcos. Published Wednesday, August 2, 2000, in the Miami Herald
If you read to Manuel Cuesta Morua's July 20 Otherviews column, Most people want to lift Cuban embargo, you probably asked: Why is the Cuban embargo still standing? That is, if you read without questioning the column's assumptions.
The column repeats old arguments and stereotypes that many use to discredit the embargo and its supporters. It is disappointing. One would hope to see more innovative arguments and a better grasp of the nuances of exile/dissident politics.
A point of clarification: I respect and admire Cuesta Morua. I respect him because -- as I was not long ago -- he is a peaceful, legitimate dissident opposing an all-powerful totalitarian state from within. I admire him because he is returning to Cuba after his visit here, something I did not
do. Consider this debate a minor disagreement among colleagues.
What worries me is that his column feeds the stereotype of ultraconservative/pro-embargo versus moderate/anti-embargo. As with all stereotypes, that is neither true nor fair. It is particularly unfair to many exiles and dissidents who -- like me, -- believe in dialogue and reconciliation, and
also support the embargo.
MAKING CONCESSIONS
According to an FIU Cuba poll, most exiles believe in a combination of both strategies, wherein the embargo forces a post-Castro Cuban regime to sit with its opponents at the negotiating table.
Cuesta Morua claims not to speak for his dissident colleagues, yet he claims to ``reflect the views of most in calling for an end to the embargo.'' Given the totalitarian regime, there are no reliable means to gauge dissidents' opinions in Cuba. For me to affirm that most dissidents support the
embargo would be inaccurate and irresponsible. It is equally so to affirm that most are against it.
Where is the evidence showing that the Cuban government can be forced toward a democratic opening by economic sanctions? There is little, but there is some.
If Cubans today freely can use U.S. dollars and profit from a few paladares [government-sanctioned mom-and-pop restaurants], they owe it exclusively to the U.S. embargo. In Fidel Castro's own words before the Cuban National Assembly in 1993, ``reality [read the U.S. embargo] forces us to do what
we would have never done otherwise . . . make concessions.'' On the other hand, where is evidence that ``constructive engagement'' will succeed where the embargo failed? China perhaps? Why don't we ask Canadians?
The Cuban government uses the embargo for propaganda purposes. But to claim that the embargo is ``a major obstacle to the peaceful transitional process we all want . . . '' is a dangerous fallacy.
No government seriously can refuse to meet with its opposition just because some foreign nation is not willing to trade with it. To put the blame on anyone but Castro ignores reality. Regarding the regime's ``defensive reaction'' allegedly caused by the embargo, Castro needs to call for internal
discipline and ideological unity. That is his regime's sine qua non; whether the embargo is lifted or not is irrelevant to him.Lifting the embargo would legitimize the model that Castro has imposed on Cubans.
That brings me to another assertion. ``Every time the United States announces some new sanction, . . . the Cuban government responds with an internal crackdown.'' The last time the United States announced new sanctions against Cuba was in 1996, after the Cuban government's crackdown against
Concilio Cubano and the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes. Cuba has continued its crackdown on dissidents -- and its anti-U.S. rhetoric -- despite the Clinton administration's relaxed posture on the embargo and attempts to improve relations.
The embargo will not topple Castro. Lifting the embargo will not topple Castro, either; but it would constitute the final act to legitimize the corrupt, incompetent and cruel model that he has imposed on Cubans. Lifting the embargo would deprive the United States of leverage to nudge a
post-Castro government toward serious economic and political reforms.
Before irreversibly changing U.S. policy toward Cuba, we need to rethink our priorities. Do we want Castroism without Castro in the short run, or a truly democratic, economically prosperous Cuba in the medium run? What we do today significantly will affect that outcome.
Sebastián A. Arcos is a member of the Havana-based Cuban Committee for Human Rights.
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