Jaime Suchlicki. Published Thursday, March 16, 2000, in the Miami Herald
Vladimir Putin's rise to power in Russia, Hugo Chavez's electoral victory in Venezuela and China's willingness to increase trade and investments are encouraging Cuba to take a more-defiant stance against the United States.
While not likely to solve Cuba's continuing economic crisis, these three events may add to the longevity of the Castro revolution. Putin, a former KGB officer with long-term relationships in Cuba, is likely to increase trade with Cuba, even to subsidize it. More important, however, a renewed
close relationship with Moscow can provide Fidel Castro with spare parts and weapons to rebuild his military.
The Chavez presidency may prove highly significant for Castro. Chavez tried unsuccessfully to incorporate Cuba into the San Jose accord. This would have provided Cuba with Venezuelan petroleum at a discounted price. Mexican and others' opposition prevented Castro's old comrade from achieving his
goal. Now it is likely that Chavez will turn to credits, financing and direct discounts for Cuba to acquire Venezuelan petroleum. Since debt-ridden Cuba will be unable to pay, this may amount to a donation of Venezuelan oil. If so, Cuba will be able to divert some of the sugar that it's trading for
Russian oil to gain hard currency from the world market.
Perhaps the most astonishing development in the past three years is the growth of Chinese investments and involvement with the Castro regime. The Chinese have built a variety of factories in the island and invested in Cuba's biotechnology industry. More important, a close military relationship
is developing between China's Peoples Liberation Army and Castro's Revolutionary Armed Forces.
Of significant concern to the United States is the Chinese establishment of an eavesdropping station in Cuba and of equipment to interfere with Radio Marti as well as to monitor U.S. military and commercial transmissions.
After the congressional ``Cox Report'' detailing Chinese espionage at a U.S. nuclear laboratory, it is hardly a secret that the Chinese are operating an extensive spy network in the Western Hemisphere. It should not further surprise that the Chinese might want an electronic espionage base close
to American shores.
China is not in the same league as the Soviets were in the 1960s or 1970s, but the Peoples Liberation Army hardly regards itself as a friend of the West. If it were, it would not have shipped potentially destabilizing advanced weapons to the Syrians and the Iranians.
DISSIDENTS PERSECUTED
Chinese foreign policy is patient and farsighted. In Cuba, the Chinese seem to be taking a calculated gamble: that the United States's complex relations with and economic interest in China will prevent the Clinton administration from raising a big fuss over what China does in Cuba.
Ominously, Castro continues to cling to an outmoded economic model. Reforms of the mid-1990s have been halted and in several cases reversed. Politically, Castro continues to oppose even the most minimal opening. While Pope John Paul II's visit encouraged expectations of greater religious and
political freedom, neither has developed. In fact, the regime is increasing the persecution of dissidents and human-rights activists.
Cuba is undergoing its own Chinese-type cultural revolution, albeit slower and less dramatic, in which an aging leader insists on purifying and rejuvenating ``his'' revolution before departing from this world.
Thus we should understand Castro's histrionics regarding Elian Gonzalez and Jose Imperatori. Castro is bent on leaving a legacy of anti-Americanism and preventing, after his passing, a turn of the revolution toward the United States. He is orchestrating the succession so his brother can take
over when he dies. In the meantime, Castro will continue to emphasize anti-Americanism and heightened nationalism -- the principal legacies of his faltering revolution.
Jaime Suchlicki, Ph.D., heads the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies.
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