Peter McKenna. National Post. June 30, 2000
Throughout its history, the Canadian-Cuban relationship has endured its share of periodic disruptions and diplomatic flaps. Ironically, a new chill seems to have swept through the two countries' diplomatic and business relations, just as the U.S.-Cuba freeze-out shows signs of thawing.
In 1960, Canada's then prime minister John Diefenbaker refused to meet with Fidel Castro during an official visit to Montreal. Several years later, Lester Pearson argued successfully that the RCMP would not be able to protect the Cuban leader should he decide to attend Expo '67 celebrations.
Even Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who had a rather cozy relationship with Castro, terminated Canada's development assistance program with Cuba over its involvement in the 1970s war in Angola. At no time, though, did Ottawa ever consider breaking diplomatic relations with Havana or backing the U.S.
economic embargo against Castro's island state.
About one year ago, a noticeably animated Prime Minister Jean Chrétien -- outraged at the imprisonment of the so-called Group of Four Cuban political dissidents and a generally deteriorating human rights milieu -- signalled a subtle shift in Canada's Cuba policy. In an impromptu scrum
with the Ottawa press corps, Mr. Chrétien indicated that Canada was about to put some "northern ice" on the bilateral relationship. Canada's longstanding policy of "constructive engagement" would remain firmly in place, but with a reduced level of activity in a decidedly
cooler diplomatic climate. Accordingly, there would be no ministerial visits to Cuba, no championing of Cuba's reintegration into the inter-American system and no joint Canada-Cuba management of a medical project in Haiti. No longer would the timing be propitious for Cuba to open a new consulate in
Vancouver.
Interestingly, the oft-heralded commercial and investment dimension of Canada's relationship with Cuba -- arguably one of the most important aspects of bilateral co-operation between the two countries -- is experiencing a surprising downturn. After years of steady growth, two-way trade figures
for 1999 show a 13% decrease from the previous year, to some $703-million from $804-million. Stated differently, bilateral trade has now dropped back to 1996 levels, and Canadian investors are beginning to cool toward revolutionary Cuba.
Some Canadian companies have also encountered a Cuban-style cold shoulder. Joint-venture partners such as Mississauga-based FirstKey Project Technologies have either been frozen out completely or simply grown tired of having to contend with long delays, changing investment rules and a stodgy
bureaucracy. Even Toronto-based Sherritt International Corp., whose company chairman was once dubbed Fidel's favourite capitalist, is starting to look elsewhere for viable investment opportunities.
But none of this has anything to do with the present chill in the bilateral relationship or Washington's anti-Cuba Helms-Burton law. Rather, the less than favourable business climate is a direct result of Havana putting the brakes on increased economic liberalization and marketization. Castro
and the old guard within his party are largely content with the way things are, and worry that a greater capitalist opening could undermine the Cuban revolution, instill destructive consumer/materialistic values and necessitate a Gorbachev-like glasnost.
As for the drop in trade, it could be little more than a transitory hiccup -- apparently, Cuba's trade with a number of other countries, such as Spain, has also decreased. This could have something to do with higher prices for imported petroleum (creating a greater drain on Cuba's foreign
currency holdings) and lower prices for Cuban sugar. There is also some evidence to suggest that the Castro government is developing more of a pan-Caribbean political and commercial interest to offset its Canadian, Spanish and French influences.
Whatever the reason, there is no disputing official Ottawa's increasing concern over the repositioning of U.S. companies, preparing themselves for a post-Castro -- and post-embargo -- Cuba. (The easing of the U.S. embargo was in no small part linked to strong pressure from the U.S. business
community and the overwhelming positive response of the American public to the Elian Gonzalez saga.) Both Canada and Cuba realize that commercial considerations have always been the principal force underpinning their bilateral relationship. But with the Chrétien government seemingly prepared
to hang tough with Havana, and the Cubans content with the status quo domestically, there is unlikely to be any thaw in the current bilateral chill -- at least in the short term. It remains to be seen whether the latest diplomatic flare-up will have a lasting negative impact on future trade between
the two countries.
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