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Lessons
of yesteryear still guide U.S. policy today
By Jaime Suchlicki. jsuchlicki@miami.edu.
Posted on Wed, Oct. 22, 2003 in The Miami
Herald.
Forty-one years ago, in the autumn of 1962,
the Soviet Union surreptitiously introduced
nuclear missiles into Cuba. A surprised,
embarrassed and angry President John F.
Kennedy instituted a blockade of the island
and after eleven tense days the Soviet Union
withdrew its missiles.
The crisis which brought the world to the
brink of a nuclear holocaust -- the missiles
of October -- helped, among other things,
to shape the perceptions of American foreign
policy leaders toward the Soviet threat
and the world. Some of the lessons of that
crisis are still with us today.
The first lesson was that there is no substitute
for alert and quality intelligence. The
United States was surprised by the Soviet
gamble, and not until the missiles were
in the island and U.S. spy planes had photographed
them did the White House discover the magnitude
of the challenge and the peril that they
represented to U.S. security. While Cubans
on the island reported suspicious movement
of missiles, U.S. intelligence failed to
warn the Kennedy administration in advance
of Soviet plans or objectives.
The second lesson was a heightened awareness
about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Following
the crisis, the United States, the Soviet
Union and most countries of the world signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A
direct telephone line was installed for
communication between the U.S. President
and the Soviet leader, and U.S. withdrawal
of some missiles from Turkey and elsewhere
followed.
The third lesson was in management of crises.
President Kennedy's careful moves during
those tense 11 days averted a nuclear confrontation.
While some in this country advocated an
invasion of Cuba and the end of the Castro
regime, the president preferred a blockade,
and diplomacy and negotiation with the Kremlin.
As we have learned since, Castro called
on Khrushchev to launch the missiles from
Cuba against the United States, an action
that would have surely forced a counter-launch
not only against Cuba but also the Soviet
Union, causing a major world catastrophe.
The fourth lesson is that weakness on the
part of the American leadership, or perception
of weakness by enemies of this country,
usually encourages those enemies to take
daring and reckless actions. The single
most important event encouraging and accelerating
Soviet involvement in Cuba was the Bay of
Pigs fiasco in 1961. The U.S. failure to
act decisively against Castro gave the Soviets
illusions about U.S. determination and interest
in the island. The Kremlin leaders now perceived
that further economic and even military
involvement in Cuba would not entail any
danger to the Soviet Union itself and would
not seriously jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations.
This view was further reinforced by President
Kennedy's apologetic attitude concerning
the Bay of Pigs invasion and his generally
weak performance during his summit meeting
with Khrushchev in Vienna in June of 1961.
The final and perhaps most important lessons
is that there are anti-American leaders
in the world willing to risk the destruction
of their countries to fulfill their political
ambitions. Castro and Khrushchev belonged
to this group -- the former because of his
anti-American hatred and his ambition to
play a power role beyond the capabilities
of his small island, and the latter because
of his desire to overcome the U.S. strategic
advantage and change the balance of power
in the world. Both were willing to take
actions that endangered their people as
well as the world.
Dangerous and daring leaders, enemies of
the United States, remain today in and out
of power in many countries. The actions
of Castro and Khrushchev in 1962 should
give us pause, but little comfort. Not only
are nuclear weapons still around, but more
ominous chemical and biological weapons
have been developed since the missile crisis.
The lessons of that crisis and the danger
of a difficult world are still with us.
Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau
Professor of History and International Studies,
and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies, University of Miami.
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