Cuba: "Essential measures" ?

Human rights crackdown in the name of security

In the most severe crackdown on the dissident movement since the years following the 1959 revolution, Cuban authorities arrested 75 dissidents in the space of several days in mid-March. They were subjected to summary trials and were quickly sentenced to long prison terms of up to 28 years. With this sweep the authorities detained, with the exception of half a dozen well-known figures critical of the regime, the bulk of the mid-level leadership of the dissident movement; many of those arrested had been involved in activities of dissent for a decade or more.

The move, unprecedented in scope, was surprising to some observers in that over the last several years Cuba had generally seemed to be moving towards a more open and permissive approach. With some exceptions, for example numerous arrests of dissidents before and after the attempted gate-crashing of the Mexican Embassy in February 2002, the number of prisoners of conscience had declined steadily over past years. The Cuban authorities had seemed to be moving away from the blanket imposition of lengthy prison sentences as a means of stifling dissent, and towards a more low-level approach of harassment, designed more to discourage than to punish critics.(1) In addition, in April 2000 Cuba began implementing a de facto moratorium on executions, which was widely welcomed by observers of the human rights situation on the island.

Given the accumulation over the last several years of these and other signals of a relaxation in human rights terms, the wave of arrests and summary trials, in addition to the execution of three men convicted of hijacking, signal an alarming step backwards in terms of respect for human rights. Not unusually in the history of fraught bilateral relations, Cuban authorities identified provocation and aggression from the United States as the root source of the tensions which caused the crackdown.

Whatever the merits of the dispute between the Cuban government and the United States over the latter's practices with regard to Cuba, a review of the limited information contained in the available trial documents indicates that the conduct for which dissidents were prosecuted was not self-evidently criminal; it was non-violent and seemed to fall within the parameters of the legitimate exercise of fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under international standards. On the basis of the available information, therefore, Amnesty International considers the 75 dissidents to be prisoners of conscience(2) and calls for their immediate and unconditional release.

2. Context on the eve of the clampdown

2.1. Some positive developments with regard to human rights

Limitations on freedom of expression, association and assembly remain codified in Cuban law; however, there were a number of indicators that repression of dissidents was waning before the crackdown in March.

One seemingly positive signal was the lack of wide scale repression of a number of initiatives by unofficial organizations in Cuba. While there were some incidents of harassment, the authorities appeared to largely ignore dissident activities. The most internationally well-known of these efforts is the Proyecto Varela petition drive for legal reform. In 2002 other initiatives, such as the Asamblea para promover la sociedad civil, Assembly to Promote Civil Society, headed by prisoner of conscience Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello, arrested in the recent crackdown, were announced.

Another positive indicator was the slow but steady decline in numbers of prisoners of conscience over the last years. However the number peaked again in February 2002: the arrest of several activists was followed by an incident at the Mexican embassy in which a busload of youths crashed a bus through the perimeter fence, in what the authorities said was a search for asylum. The incident sparked more arrests of dissidents, with the result that at the end of 2002 there were more prisoners of conscience than at any point during the previous year.

On the eve of the March 2003 clampdown on dissent, Amnesty International had identified 15 Cubans as prisoners of conscience, detained solely for peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms: Yosvany Aguilar Camejo; José Aguilar Hernández; Bernardo Arévalo Padrón; Oscar Elías Biscet González; Leonardo Bruzón Avila; Francisco Chaviano González; Rafael Corrales Alonso; Carlos Alberto Domínguez González; Emilio Leyva Pérez; Eddy Alfredo Mena y González; Carlos Oquendo Rodríguez; Ricardo Ramos Pereira; Lázaro Miguel Rodríguez Capote; Néstor Rodríguez Lobaina; and Jorge Enrique Santana Carreiras.(3)

A de facto moratorium on executions dating back to April 2000 was seen as another positive sign; although some new death sentences continued to be handed down, there was no information indicating that executions had been carried out. This changed with the April 2003 executions of three young men summarily tried and convicted under new anti-terrorism legislation, following a hijacking in which no one was harmed (see below).

2.2. Improving relations with the international community

Cuba's relations with some sectors of the international community seemed to be improving in 2002 and early 2003. Political dialogue with the European Union, blocked for five years over a number of issues, including human rights concerns, had reopened with an initial meeting in December 2001. A follow-up meeting with representatives of the European Union was held in November 2002, and in March 2003 the first-ever official European Union delegation was opened in Havana.

In April 2002 the UN Human Rights Commission had passed a relatively mild resolution on human rights in Cuba, and in November 2002, for the 11th consecutive year, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the USA to end its embargo against Cuba.

Cuba's relations with Canada, which had deteriorated over the three previous years, improved with the visit of a senior Canadian official in November 2002, and bilateral relations with a number of other countries appeared to be strong or improving.


2.3. Ongoing tensions with the United States

One exception to this pattern was the ongoing tension with the government of the United States. Relations between the two countries have been strained since the 1959 revolution, becoming increasingly so with Cuba's espousal of a socialist system and the 1961 US-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations, although from 1977 Interests Sections were set up in their respective capitals. The tension between them has affected both bilateral and international relations, and can be seen in numerous areas.


The US embargo against Cuba

The US has operated a financial and trade embargo against Cuba since 1962. It has consistently maintained that it will only change its policy if it sees fundamental political shifts on the island. The Cuban authorities maintain that the embargo is illegal and has caused massive suffering in Cuba, and regularly call for it to be repealed. This call has been consistently made by others as well, including the United Nations General Assembly (see below).

US legislation strengthening the embargo has been passed several times since its inception; in one such effort, in March 1996, US president Bill Clinton signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act," otherwise known as the "Helms-Burton Act" after the lawmakers who sponsored it. The text of that law is discussed in more detail below. In more recent years, however, calls in the US for a lifting of the embargo have increased.

Since his inauguration, US president George W. Bush indicated that he would veto any legislative attempt to remove the embargo or other restrictions on Cuba unless a multiparty system was established and elections held. This position was criticised by former US president Jimmy Carter, whose visit to Cuba in May 2002 marked the highest-level visit from the USA since 1959. There was also opposition to the Bush administration's approach from other sectors in the US; in October 2002, the US House of Representatives voted to end travel restrictions on US citizens wanting to visit Cuba, and Cuba continued to receive visits from local and national US lawmakers, among other public figures.


Human rights and the US embargo

Amnesty International calls for the lifting of sanctions where it believes the continuation of sanctions might contribute to grave human rights abuses. A review of the impact of the US embargo against Cuba and other related policies in this regard is deeply worrying.

a. Impact of the embargo on economic, social and cultural rights

In November 2002, for the eleventh consecutive year, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution that called on the US to "take the necessary steps to repeal or invalidate" the embargo against Cuba and related measures.(4) The resolution, entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba," passed by 173 votes to 3, with 4 abstentions.

The vote followed the issuance of a report of the same name by the UN Secretary General; the General Assembly had requested that the report be drawn up in its 2001 resolution condemning the embargo. In that report, UN agencies resoundingly condemned the impact of the embargo on the economic, social and cultural life of Cuba. A selection of their comments provided in the text box below demonstrates how the embargo has affected all areas of life on the island.

The overwhelming evaluation of the relevant UN agencies is that the US embargo against Cuba is highly detrimental to Cubans' enjoyment of a range of economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, much of their analysis indicates that the negative effects of the embargo are felt disproportionately, not by the decisionmakers and authorities whose policies the embargo is aimed at influencing, but by the weakest and most vulnerable members of the population.

UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, was unequivocal about the negative impact of the embargo, indicating that it "has an impact upon all spheres of Cuban society. It affects particularly the efforts of the Government of Cuba to protect children, adolescents, women and families, as defined in the Convention of the Rights of the Child."(6)

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization found that "in the case of education, where Cuba has achieved very important development levels, there has been an exacerbation in the scarcity of material resources for the publication of textbooks, the lack of availability of educational materials, the deterioration of many educational centres, the decrease in the quality of food and the drop in material incentives for teaching personnel … The embargo has also retarded the scientific development of the country."(7) UNESCO's findings "demonstrate(s) the need to put into effect the call on the United States Government to put an end to this policy, which violates the rights of the Cuban people."(8)

The United Nations Population Fund added: "The decades-long United States economic embargo has exacerbated the situation and contributed to a further deterioration of the quality of life of the Cuban population. In 2001, the standard of living indicators stood below 1990 levels. The scarcity of financial assistance and severe restrictions on imports due to financial constraints have taken their toll on the delivery of basic social services."(9)

The World Health Organisation condemned the health impact of the embargo: "at the outset, it should be noted that the embargo has had a very significant negative impact on the overall performance of the national economy, diverting the optimal allocation of resources from the prioritized areas and affecting the health programmes and services. This, in the end, compromises the quality of life of the population, specifically the children, the elderly and the infirm."(10)

b. Impact of the embargo on the enjoyment of civil and political rights

In addition, Amnesty International believes that the US embargo has helped to undermine the enjoyment of key civil and political rights in Cuba by fuelling a climate in which such fundamental rights as freedom of association, expression and assembly are routinely denied. The embargo provides the Cuban government with an excuse for its repressive policies, while the widespread sympathy the country has garnered for resisting US pressure has left third countries reluctant to push Cuba to resolve its human rights crisis. Specific embargo provisions have also undermined the development of a human rights movement on the island, which in turn weakens prospects for the emergence of an independent civil society.

This impact can be seen most clearly on the legal front. The Cuban authorities have systematically defended their repressive legal system on the grounds that states under aggression have the right to restrict freedoms in the interests of national security.

Article 1 of Cuba's Constitution names it as an explicitly socialist state.(11) The Constitution conditions the exercise of fundamental freedoms on support for the system:

None of the liberties recognised for the citizens can be exercised against what is established by the Constitution and the laws, or against the existence and objectives of the socialist state, or against the decision of the Cuban people to construct socialism and communism.(12)

In addition to conditioning the exercise of rights in this way, the Constitution specifically declares Cuba as "anti-imperialist and internationalist," and declares that Cuba

repudiates direct or indirect intervention in the internal or external matters of any State and, therefore, armed aggression, economic blockade, and any other form of economic or political coercion...(15)

Then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Roberto Robaina demonstrated the link during a 1995 address, the language of which is strikingly similar to recent official declarations:

... we can only make further progress if the policies and actions contrary to the interests of the vast majority of our people are eliminated. No country admits the legal existence of organised groups that endanger the democratic system in power, particularly if that system was created on the basis of a consensus such as few peoples in the world have ever known. In other words: in Cuba it is not possible to make a counter-revolution legally, especially if the credentials for doing so are obtained in the offices of the representative of our number-one enemy.(16)

under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act (officially, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act) and the Torricelli Act (officially, the Cuban Democracy Act), which stipulate specific conditions and time-frames for the lifting of the embargo, the United States of America assumes the right to be the outside party that determines the rules for converting the current totalitarian system into a different, more pluralist one. This inspires doubt rather than confidence about the future and may cause some dissidents to feel that their own criteria are irrelevant and that Cuba's future will in any case be decided without consulting them. The direct result of this situation could be a decline in the trend towards overt political activity and the risk it implies.(17)

We then had extensive meetings with a wide range of the most notable dissidents, each the leader of an organization and many having completed prison sentences for their demands for change in the socialist regime. They were unanimous in expressing appreciation for my speech, willingness to risk punishment rather than be silent, hope that American visitation could be expanded, and opposition to any elevation of harsh rhetoric from the United States toward Cuba and to any funding of their efforts from the U.S. government. Any knowledge or report of such financial support would just give credibility to the long-standing claims of President Castro that they were "paid lackeys" of Washington.(18)

The situation of the 'Miami Five'

Tensions between the two countries have been heightened over the last months by disputes over the treatment of five Cuban men, René González, Fernando González, Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, Antonio Guerrero and Ramón Labañino, convicted in the US in 2001 on charges of spying on behalf of Cuba. The Cuban authorities gave much attention to the case, describing the men as heroes whose sole aim had been to protect Cuba from a potential terrorist threat by infiltrating exile groups in Miami, and their campaign received substantial support internationally.

In November 2002, the five men demanded a retrial on the grounds that anti-Cuba bias in Miami prevented them from getting a fair trial. Amnesty International wrote to the US authorities on several occasions to express concern at the treatment received by the men and the difficulties faced by their families in gaining access to them.


The 'war on terror'

Cuban officials have criticised the United States for not acting against certain groups among the Cuban exile community in the US which are allegedly training for a possible armed invasion of Cuba.(19) One such group, Comandos F-4, reportedly claims to have shot and wounded a Cuban spy in Havana earlier this year.(20)

For its part, the US has also made accusations against Cuba. On 6 May 2002 the Undersecretary of State for arms control, John R. Bolton, alleged that Cuba was researching biological weapons and had provided technology to "other rogue states."(21) His allegation coincided with the runup to the visit of former President Jimmy Carter to Cuba, during which Carter maintained that US authorities who briefed him prior to the visit had assured him there was no such evidence. In a statement during a visit to the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in Havana, Carter said that "there were absolutely no such allegations made or questions raised" during "intense briefings from the State Department, the intelligence agencies - and high officials in the White House" before his visit to Cuba.(22)

Cuba also roundly denied the accusations. Former president Carter stated that in response to the allegations, President Castro had offered to open Cuba's biotechnology research facilities for inspection.(23)

Since that time, somewhat conflicting signals have emerged from the US administration about this issue. Prominent administration members, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, were reported to have distanced themselves from the allegation.(24) It was repeated again, however, by then-Assistant Secretary of State for the Western hemisphere Otto Reich.(25) The US Department of State's "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report for 2001 contained no mention of the allegation; neither did the 2002 report, released on 20 April 2003.

However, the latter report again included Cuba in a list of seven "state sponsors of terrorism," defined as states which have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism."(26) With regard to Cuba, the report acknowledged that Cuba had signed and ratified all twelve international counterterrorism conventions in 2001 and noted that "Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan;" however, it continued, "it has remained opposed to the US-led Coalition prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical of many associated US policies and actions."(27)

The specific accusations against Cuba were that it "continued to host several terrorists and US fugitives" and " sent agents to US missions around the world who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11 investigation."(28)

In mid-March, against the backdrop of preparations for the US-led military invasion of Iraq and widespread speculation that other states accused of sponsoring terrorism might also be targeted, the Cuban authorities detained scores of dissidents on accusations of seeking to subvert the Cuban system and conspiring with the US.

3. The mass arrests: a sudden and unprecedented crackdown

I am certain that informing others objectively and professionally and writing my opinions about the society in which I live cannot be a very serious crime - no one, no law will make me believe that I have become a gangster or a delinquent just because I report the arrest of a dissident, or list the prices of staple foods in Cuba, or write that I find it appalling that more than 20,000 Cubans every year go into exile in the United States and hundreds of others try to go anywhere they can.(29) - Raúl Rivero Castañeda, in 1999. He was arrested in the crackdown and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

For several days beginning on 18 March 2003, Cuban security forces began arresting known dissidents across the island. Those detained included journalists and economists, doctors, pro-democracy members of illegal opposition parties and other activists. According to reports, security agents searched the homes of those detained, confiscating computers, fax machines, typewriters, books and papers; in a number of cases, this material was then included in the prosecution's case against the activists.

3.1. Cuba's official stance on the mass arrests

As they had often done in the past, Cuban authorities immediately justified the crackdown as an unavoidable response to US aggression. They maintained that the behaviour of James Cason, head of the US Interests Section in Havana, was the immediate catalyst for the crackdown.

Since his arrival in Cuba in September 2002, the head of the US Interests Section,(30) James Cason, had reportedly taken a higher and more active profile and more public stance in criticising the Cuban system than his predecessors. As one journalist wrote in January after an interview with him, "Since he arrived, Cason says, he has put more than 4,000 miles on his car and visited nine of Cuba's 14 provinces, talking to hitchhikers along the way and dining with dissidents and religious leaders in the island's heartland."(31) In the period leading up to the crackdown Cason reportedly made a high-profile visit to a meeting of dissidents and spoke with international journalists gathered there, as well as allowing dissidents to use his official residence for events.

In the days leading up to the crackdown, Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque described what he called "really unprecedented behaviour, something new for us since the Section was created," and said that the Cuban government believed it to be part of a deliberate plan to strain relations.(32) President Castro indicated that on 17 March, the day before the crackdown began, the Cuban authorities submitted a written note to the US Interests Section to protest at what they considered James Cason's violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.(33)

The official note announcing the arrests opens with a condemnation of

the shameless and repeated provocations of the Head of the United States Interests Section in Cuba, obviously conceived and carried out as part of the hostile and aggressive policy of the current Administration towards our country, with the close cooperation and support of the terrorist mafia in Miami and the extreme right of the United States.(34)

No country, as powerful as it may be, has the right to convert its diplomatic representation into the organizer, funder, chief and general headquarters of activities to destabilize, subvert the constitutional order, break the laws, conspire against the social development, sabotage the economic relations, threaten the security and destroy the independence of another country.(35)

There should not be the slightest doubt that the Revolution will apply with the necessary rigor, and as required by the circumstances, the laws created to defend itself from new and old tactics and strategies against Cuba.(36)

In a 9 April speech on the trials of the dissidents, Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque refuted allegations that Cuba had timed the crackdown to take advantage of diverted global attention to the conflict in Iraq, repeating again the official justification of the arrests:

these arrests were carried out before the beginning of the war in Iraq - it was before that the decision was made and the arrests were carried out as a consequence of the unsustainable situation that we had been put in by the provocations and irresponsible behaviour of Mr. Cason.(37)

Foreign Minister Pérez Roque indicated that Cuba reserved the right to close the Interests Section:

We know that this is the hope, the golden dream of those who maintain the blockade and the policy of aggression towards Cuba; it may also be the dream of Mr. Cason, his heroic return expelled from Cuba. We know well who would celebrate and welcome this decision; but, in any case, closing the Interests Section in Havana and asking Mr. Cason to leave the country is a right that we reserve.(38)

In later speeches, additional aggravating factors in US-Cuba relations were added to the official explanation. Cuban authorities have consistently criticised US immigration policy; they claim it encourages dangerous attempts at illegal migration by automatically granting Cubans, unlike those of other nationalities, the automatic right to legal status upon arrival on US soil. In a 25 April speech, President Castro described a series of recent hijackings of Cuban vessels by individuals attempting to reach the US, and accused the US of violating bilateral migration agreements and putting Cuban lives at risk by provoking such attempts: "the most serious part of the conspiracy against Cuba ... is the aim of breaking the Migration Accords and forcing a mass emigration."(39)

President Castro went even further, accusing the US not just of provoking mass migration but of doing so as an excuse for armed intervention: "the sinister idea is to provoke armed conflict between Cuba and the United States. In this way they hope to liquidate the Revolution."(40)

3.2. Domestic reaction to the crackdown

There were important reactions to the crackdown from within Cuba. In a significant move, the permanent committee of Cuba's Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a press release on 11 April expressing concern at recent events.

On 22 April a group of Cuban women, including wives and mothers of those convicted, reportedly presented at the Council of State building a letter addressed to Fidel Castro asking for an end to repression and executions in Cuba:

We demand the abolition of the death penalty, as a crime with judicial trappings. Also, the elimination of the excessive sentences imposed on 75 peaceful human rights defenders -- independent journalists and economists and oopposition members -- only for expressing their opinions openly. (41)

3.3. International response

The international condemnation of the crackdown in Cuba has been unprecedented, indicating that a significant portion of the international community did not accept Cuba's justification for its actions or felt that its response had been excessive and ill-judged. At the same time, Cuba avoided specific condemnation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights

...We want to say that this does not change the fact, however, that we reject also the final Resolution that was adopted. We reject it because, although it is not a condemnatory text, it is a text which is not justified ... it is a North American text, which corresponds to North American interests. (45)

Cuba does not refuse to cooperate with the High Commissioner, on the contrary; nor with the non-selective and non-discriminatory mechanisms of the Commission or the Office of the High Commissioner, of course not. What Cuba is not willing to accept is the manipulation of this topic; the unscrupulous use, even of the United Nations itself, to justify the campaign against Cuba ... it is for this reason that Cuba does not accept the mandate of the resolution.(46)

At the end of the Commission session, Cuba was re-elected as one of the 53 members of the Commission. A spokesman for the US White House reportedly said Cuba's election was "like putting Al Capone in charge of bank security."(47) The US had itself lost its seat in 2001 for the first time since the Commission's establishment in 1947, to return to it one year later.

European Union

The crackdown came just as relations with Europe had improved significantly. On 12 March, just days before the wave of arrests began, the European Union opened its first-ever office in Cuba. Poul Nielson, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, visited the island to open the delegation and stated publicly that the EU intended to strengthen its relations with Cuba.(48) He also welcomed Cuba's application for admission to the Cotonou trade agreement.(49)

Following the crackdown, in his 9 April press conference on the trials, Foreign Minister Pérez Roque addressed the issue of the EU's relations with Cuba. He was critical of the parallels between the EU's positions and those of the US:

The European Union has not had the capacity to project an independent position towards Cuba, and this explains its lukewarm reaction to the blockade against Cuba; it explains its aligning itself with the North American position against Cuba in Geneva; it explains the fact that they have not been capable of forming a European position on Cuba that defends international law ...I should remind you that Cuba has already once withdrawn its application to the Cotonou Agreement, and if it had to do so again it would.(50)

On 14 April the External Relations Council of the European Union adopted a resolution on Cuba condemning the mass arrests, unfair trials and excessive sentences as well as the executions of the three hijackers. The resolution stated,

These latest developments display a deterioration in the human rights situation in Cuba and will both affect EU/Cuba relations and the perspectives of strengthened cooperation. The Council will continue to monitor the situation closely.(51)

On 23 April, the European Commission scheduled for the following week a debate on its reaction to the situation in Cuba; several member states were reportedly considering downgrading the level of their cooperation with the island.(53) On 30 April the Commission announced its decision to freeze consideration of Cuba's application. On 16 May, Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the head of the European Commission delegation that Cuba was cancelling its application to the Cotonou Agreement. The Ministry's official statement issued the following day concluded:

Cuba has resisted more than 44 years of embargo, aggression and threats from the United States without surrendering, and it sees no reason whatsoever to accept pressure from anyone else.(54)

These recent developments reverse earlier improvements in relations with the EU, and make Cuba ineligible for EU development funds and other assistance earmarked for ACP countries.

Organization of American States

The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Organisation of American States (OAS) expressed concern at the arrests and summary trials, and "urged the Cuban authorities once again to change their position regarding the independent press and to allow all inhabitants the right to freedom of expression and information."(55) On World Press Freedom Day, 3 May 2003, the Special Rapporteur joined his UN counterpart, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, to express grave concern at the sentences given out to the dissidents.(56)

Meanwhile, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights condemned the executions of the three would-be hijackers(57) and expressed grave concern at the detention and trial of the dissidents.(58)

Several efforts to introduce a resolution by the 34-member OAS condemning human rights violations in Cuba failed due to lack of support. On 19 May, Canada, Chile and Uruguay, which had sponsored the latest effort, re-submitted the text in a non-binding form to the Permanent Council of the OAS. Sixteen of the member states signed on to the revised statement, indicating a sharp divide among members. In 1962, the OAS had decided that adherence by any of its members to Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the inter-American system and that such incompatibility therefore excluded "the present government of Cuba" from participation in the system.

United States

The United States firmly condemned the crackdown, and, as in previous years, provided impetus for the UN Human Rights Commission text condemning Cuba; the rejection of the Costa Rica amendment was therefore seen as a defeat of the initiative preferred by the US. It had played a similar role with regard to the effort to produce a resolution condemning Cuba by the OAS, with comparable results (see above).

a. Discussion of tightening of the embargo

In response to the crackdown, organisations in the US which had favoured an easing of US relations with Cuba quickly revised their positions. The board of directors of one such group, the Cuba Policy Foundation, resigned in protest at the crackdown in Cuba:

We organized, funded and supported the Foundation because we hoped, and had reason to believe, that its energetic efforts to modify the ban on Cuba trade, travel and investment might succeed over time. We can only conclude, however, that in spite of its claims to the contrary, Cuba does not share our enthusiasm for a more open relationship. For this reason we have tendered our resignations.(59)

b. Heightened rhetoric between Cuba and the US

Some US officials went even further in their statements, fuelling increasingly strong rhetoric between the US and Cuba. On 10 April, the US ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Hans Hertell, indicated that the war in Iraq was an example for Cuba: "I think what is happening in Iraq is going to send a very positive signal, and it is a very good example for Cuba, where we saw that last week the Fidel Castro regime ordered the arrest of more than 80 citizens."(62)

US diplomat Wayne Smith, Head of the US Interests Section under President Jimmy Carter, said "the Cubans saw it [ the Iraq war ] as a signal that the United States was determined to throw its weight around and to blow away anyone it doesn't like through the unilateral use of force."(63) Speaking to National Public Radio, he said "there is a certain sense on the part of the Cubans that they might be next."(64)

On the Cuban side there were statements that reinforced the impression that Cuban officials felt under threat in the context of the war in Iraq. The president of the International Relations Committee of the Cuban parliament told regional press, "I believe that countries like ours, that are considered by the United States as its enemies, are in more danger than others; but we should not see it as a matter affecting one country alone, it really is a risk for everyone." (65)

In an interview with a US television network, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld responded to a question about whether the US would consider 'the liberation of the Cuban people' by saying that at the present time "there are no plans for military action against Cuba."(66) He said that that could change if Cuba were believed to possess weapons of mass destruction.

In his May Day speech, President Castro again alluded to the perceived threat of US military aggression against Cuba, stating that "in Miami and in Washington it is being discussed today where, how and when to attack Cuba."(67) He ended the speech with a dramatic appeal for peace between the two countries, while reiterating the willingness of the Cuban people to fight if needed to defend their country.

On 13 May the Bush administration, in one of the largest such expulsions to date, expelled 14 Cuban diplomats from the US. Seven worked at the Interests Section in Washington, and seven more at the Cuban mission to the UN in New York. Although official statements about the reasons for the expulsions varied, they indicated that the Cuban diplomats had been accused of "inappropriate activities."

Other agencies and organisations

On 26 April the Vatican announced that Pope John Paul had written to President Castro on 13 April to express sorrow at the executions and the harsh sentences against dissidents. The letter reportedly asked for a gesture of clemency from the Cuban authorities.(68)

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern over the arrests and the fairness of the expedited trials, including with regard to the right to defence.(69) The director general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was among those who denounced the arrests.(70)

Numerous governments expressed their deep concern at the events to the Cuban diplomatic representatives in their countries. More than 300 artists, intellectuals and politicians joined a campaign begun by a Spanish magazine on behalf of the detainees; a separate international campaign, in support of Cuba's position, drew attention from other artists and intellectuals.(71)

Activists of the human rights organisation Reporters without Borders were reportedly beaten by embassy security guards while protesting the arrest of 26 journalists during the crackdown. The protest took place in front of the Cuban embassy in Paris on 24 April. The confrontation occurred when the activists handcuffed themselves to the property's fence. On 1 April the organisation's activists had briefly occupied the Cuba tourism office in Paris.

Overall, the March crackdown was met with an unprecedented international reaction, prompting a heightened level of scrutiny of Cuba's human rights situation at many different levels. The impact of this in Cuba remains unclear.

4. The legal proceedings against the dissidents

The March arrests were handled differently than smaller-scale multiple arrests carried out in 2002. In February 2002, a group of young men drove a commandeered public bus into the Mexican Embassy compound in Havana in an apparent attempt to secure asylum and leave Cuba; the incident set off a chain of arrests of known dissidents, and was thought to influence the continued detention of several who had just been arrested. Most of the dissidents were released thereafter, but ten of them remain in detention and are considered by Amnesty International to be prisoners of conscience. In those cases, the men were not promptly brought to justice; over a year has passed without them being brought to trial.(72)

In contrast, those arrested in the March sweep were brought to trial immediately and subjected to hasty collective proceedings. While a number of aspects of the judicial process were flawed, Amnesty International will focus on the charges brought against the defendants and their trials and sentencing.

4.1. The charges brought against the dissidents

Significantly, the charges brought against those arrested in the crackdown did not include the more common accusations usually used to suppress dissent, such as propaganda enemiga, enemy propaganda, desacato, disrespect, or desórdenes públicos, public disorder. Rather, the emphasis was on more serious offences which carry higher penalties under the Cuban Penal Code.

Article 91 of the Penal Code

Amnesty International has had access to trial documents for 51 of the 75 dissidents tried. Article 91 of the Penal Code, which was the sole charge for 26 of the dissidents and was used in conjunction with Law 88 (see below) for another six, provides for sentences of ten to 20 years or death against anyone convicted of "acts against the independence or territorial integrity of the state."(73) Under this article, "he who, in the interest of a foreign state, commits an act with the objective of damaging the independence or territorial integrity of the Cuban state, incurs the penalty of ten to twenty years imprisonment or death."(74)

Law 87 of 1999, which modifies the Penal Code, changes the provisions regarding sentencing to provide for life imprisonment.

Law 88

In nineteen of the 51 cases that Amnesty International has been able to review in detail, dissidents were charged under Law 88, the Ley de Protección de la Independencia Nacional y la Economía de Cuba, Law for the Protection of the National Independence and Economy of Cuba. In another six cases, Law 88 was used in conjunction with article 91 of the Penal Code (see above).


a. The build-up to Law 88

As mentioned above, in March 1996, US President Bill Clinton signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act," otherwise known as the "Helms-Burton Act" after the lawmakers who sponsored it. The text condemned recent events in Cuba,(75) tightened the US embargo, and discouraged investment in Cuba by providing for penalties against foreign companies investing there. It also provided for claims of confiscation of property and for US assistance to 'democracy-building efforts' in Cuba (see text box).

In December 1996 the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, the National Assembly of Popular Power, passed Law 80, Ley de Reafirmación de la Dignidad y Soberanía Cubana, Law of Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty. This law was an explicit response to the Helms-Burton law:

The National Assembly of Popular Power, as representative of the people, repudiates the 'Helms-Burton Law' and declares its irrevocable decision to adopt the measures in its power as a response to this anti-Cuban legislation.(76)

Whereas, the Government of the United States has dedicated itself to promoting, organizing, financing and directing counterrevolutionary and imperialist elements inside and outside the territory of the Republic of Cuba. For four decades it has invested significant financial and material resources to carry out numerous covert activities in order to destroy the independence and economy of Cuba, using to such end individuals recruited within the national territory, as has been recognized by the Central Intelligence Agency since 1961 according to a report released in 1998.(77)

through the Law of 12 March 1996 known as the Helms-Burton Law, the United States expanded, intensified and codified its economic war against Cuba and detailed how such assistance would be given to individuals who would be used in the national territory to carry out the subversive and imperialist objectives of the Empire … the Federal Budget Law, passed on 21 October 1998 by the Government of the United States, set a minimum of two million dollars to support counterrevolutionary activities in Cuba …(78)

the laws which were applied to try the mercenaries who act in the service of the power that is attacking its people, are laws dating from the end of the 90s and that had not been applied, in a spirit of tolerance; they were our response to Helms-Burton; but we have been placed in a situation where we had no other option, and we have acted.(80)

It is the North American Interests Section in Havana, and this has been fully proven in the trials, that creates, directs, finances, stimulates, protects the creation and the subversive work of its agents in Cuba. How does it do this ? In fulfillment of the Helms-Burton Law.(81)

such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) for the respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.(82)

none of the liberties recognised for the citizens can be exercised against what is established by the Constitution and the laws, or against the existence and objectives of the socialist state, or against the decision of the Cuban people to construct socialism and communism.(84)

Amnesty International has reviewed trial documents for 51 of the 75 dissidents prosecuted. The section on individual cases below contains information on the specific charges against given individuals. In general, the prosecutors' briefs accuse the dissidents of

· receiving funds and/or materials from the United States government, either through its agencies or third parties,
· in order to engage in a number of activities which the authorities perceived as subversive and damaging to Cuba's internal order and/or beneficial to the embargo or other punitive measures by the US against Cuba.

As mentioned above, the Helms-Burton Law provides for US funding for individuals and groups to support "democracy-building" efforts in Cuba. In addition, the US funds other initiatives, such as Miami-based Radio Martí, aimed at disseminating within Cuba views critical of Castro and the Cuban system. Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque made extensive references to this funding in his 9 April press release on the trials of the dissidents.(88) Security agents of the Cuban state who had infiltrated dissident groups, and who later testified against some dissidents at their trials, reported regularly receiving and handling funds from various groups in the United States that were in turn financed by agencies of the US government.(89) The text box provided here gives a sample of the information publicly available on such funding.

As also mentioned above, Cuba has consistently expressed outrage at these practices, declaring them, with the US embargo, acts of aggression against Cuba. Cuba has moreover accused the US of an escalation of provocations against Cuba following the posting of James Cason as head of the US Interests Section in Havana.

The dissidents were not charged under articles of the Penal Code covering spying or revelation of secrets concerning state security (articles 95-97), and the evidence given does not point to such activity. None of them held sensitive positions of authority through which they would have access to privileged information. Whatever the merits of the Cuban government's argument with the United States over its practices in Cuba, a review of the limited information contained in the trial documents indicates that the specific behaviour for which dissidents were prosecuted was non-violent and seemed to fall within the parameters of the legitimate exercise of fundamental freedoms rather than those of any recogniseable criminal activity.

According to the trial documents available, the activities on which the prosecutions were based included, among others,

· publishing articles or giving interviews, in US-funded or other media, said to be critical of economic, social or human rights matters in Cuba.
· communicating with international human rights organisations.
· having contact with entities or individuals viewed as hostile to Cuba's interests, including US functionaries in Cuba and hardline figures or groups in the Cuban exile community in the United States and Europe.(90)
· distributing or possessing material, such as radios, battery chargers, video equipment or publications, from the US Interests Section in Havana.
· being involved in groups which have not been officially recognised by the Cuban authorities and which were accused of being counterrevolutionary, including among others unofficial trade unions, professional associations such as doctors' and teachers' associations, academic institutes, press associations and independent libraries.
Despite the Cuban government's claims that such acts threatened national security and therefore warranted prosecution, the above activities constitute legitimate exercise of freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and cannot in themselves justify the authorities' repressive reaction.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides funds for work on Cuba pursuant to the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Solidarity ('Libertad') Act (Helms-Burton Act). The goal of the program is to "promote rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba, helping develop civil society." The program description states that USAID policy precludes recipients from using grant funds to provide cash assistance to any person or organisation in Cuba.

Recipients under the project for "Building solidarity with Cuba's human rights activists" include:

· Freedom House: Cuban Democracy Project ($1,325,000): "promotes the formation of civil and political leadership in Cuba by linking professional organizations in Cuba to one another and to those in free democracies."
· Grupo de Apoyo a la Disidencia (Dissidence Support Group) ($2,700,000): "provides humanitarian assistance and informational materials to political prisoners and their families and other victims of repression."
· International Republican Institute ($2,174,462): "helps create and bolster international solidarity committees in Latin America and Europe to provide material, moral and ideological support for democratic activists in Cuba."
Recipients under the "Giving voice to Cuba's independent journalists" project include:

· Cuba Free Press ($280,000 - completed): "published the work of professional and independent writers and journalists inside Cuba."
· CubaNet ($833,000): "expanding its comprehensive internet on-line coverage of Cuba's independent journalists, and other national and international press reports on Cuban human rights and economic issues."
The "Helping develop independent Cuban NGOs" project recipients include:

· Pan American Development Foundation ($553,500): "establishes linkages between Cuban NGOs and counterpart NGOs operating elsewhere in the Americas, to demonstrate how NGOs function within democratic societies. Provides information and material assistance to Cuba's independent libraries."
· University of Miami: developing civil society ($320,000 – completed): "facilitated access to information and training for Cuban NGOs and individuals."
· Florida International University: NGO development ($291,749): "trains Cuban NGO leaders in management and delivery of social services."
The "Planning for transition" project recipients include:

· US-Cuba Business Council ($852,000 – completed): "surveyed US private sector resources and plans to assist the eventual reconstruction of the Cuba economy. Conducted a conference series on Cuba's democratic free market future."
· University of Miami: Cuba transition planning ($1,545,000): "analyzes challenges that will face a future transition government in Cuba, including: legal reform, political party formation, privatization and foreign investment, combating corruption, education reform, economic policy reform, international donor coordination."
(Source: USAID webpage, www.usaid.gov/regions/lac/cu/upd-cub.htm).

4.3. The trials: summary justice

As mentioned previously, the treatment of those detained in the March mass arrests was different from those caught up in previous crackdowns in February and December 2002. In the earlier arrests, dissidents were either released after a short period or held for long stretches without trial. One factor of note about the March arrests was the speed with which trials were organised and held; the majority of trials were concluded by the end of the first week of April.

As Amnesty International and other human rights organisations have previously noted, the right to a fair trial is severely limited in Cuba, with the courts and prosecutors under government control. Article 75 of the Constitution states that Cubas National Assembly should elect the President, Vice-President and the other judges of the Peoples Supreme Court, as well as the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.(91) According to Article 121 of the Constitution, the courts are hierarchically subordinate to the National Assembly and the Council of State. This raises concerns with regard to the internationally-recognised right to trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.(92)

The full exercise of the right to defence is also problematic, as lawyers are employed by the Cuban state and as such may be reluctant to challenge prosecutors and the evidence presented by the security apparatus. This raises concern with regard to respect for the right to an effective defence.(93)

The dissidents' trials were generally held in provincial courts. Once the prosecution has prepared its case, the defendant is meant to be allowed access to a defence lawyer, although this was reportedly not respected in these cases. In instances where the defendant did not appoint a lawyer, an abogado de oficio, ex-officio advocate, was assigned. Family members and colleagues of the accused charged that the authorities denied the attorneys access to the defendant and said that as a result they had been unable to prepare their defense, in violation of international fair trial standards.

The hearings took place in front of panels of judges. Although some family members and others were allowed to attend, foreign diplomats and some journalists were barred from entering.

Foreign Minister Pérez Roque defended Cuba's recourse to summary trials in these cases, and denied claims that the right to an adequate defense had not been respected. In a press release following the trials, he noted that 54 attorneys took part in the 29 trials, representing 75 dissidents; and that of these 44 were named by the defendants or their families. He maintained that foreign diplomats had no reason to attend the trials.

A total of twelve reported state security agents testified at the April trials; they had been involved in the dissident movement for a number of years, and several of them had become prominent leaders of groups of journalists or other activists.(94) Some observers expressed the opinion that the fact that the government was willing to reveal so many of its agents indicated the seriousness of the crackdown.

In a recorded 9 April press conference, Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque presented journalists with a series of pieces of evidence from the dissidents' trials. Copies of these were distributed at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and a copy is attached here as Appendix 1. The evidence includes:

· A copy of an open entry badge to the US Interests Section in the name of dissident Oscar Elías Biscet.
· A list entitled 'Summary of shipments carried out' from what appears to be an account based in Coral Gables, Florida, USA, for Frank Hernández Trujillo, reportedly head of the US-based Grupo de Apoyo a la Disidencia, Group for Support to Dissidence. The list contains dates; dispatch numbers; names and identity card numbers of recipients, some of whom were caught up in the crackdown; and the type of goods. These included money, videos, lamps and telephones.
· Two photos of James Cason with what appears to be the same group of individuals; the captions say "James Cason founds the 'youth wing of the Liberal Cuban Party'" and "James Cason shares snacks with the 'future' of subversion." A third photo shows Cason with prominent dissident Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello.
· A photocopy of what appears to be the cover of a magazine, 'De Cuba: Revista de la Sociedad de Periodistas Manuel Márquez Sterling, miembro de la Red Internacional de Reporteros sin Fronteras,' From Cuba: Magazine of the Journalists Society 'Manuel Márquez Sterling', member of the International Network of Reporters sans frontières, dated December 2002. The subtitle says that the magazine was printed in the US Interests Section.
· A handwritten signed note on letterhead of the 'Bibliotecas independientes de Cuba,' 'Independent Libraries of Cuba,' apparently referring to the receipt and spending of US dollars.
· Three handwritten notes, apparently to dissident Osvaldo Alfonso, on letterhead marked 'Carlos Alberto Montaner.'(95) The text of the notes indicate that two were accompanied by a sum of US$ 200 and the third by 30,000 Spanish pesetas. The text of one says that "everyone has as an outlook the death of Fidel. Afterwards, we'll see." The text of another mentions the Varela Project. The explanatory note gives the full text as "Very soon some high level Spanish friends will call you to talk about the Varela Project. I suggested five names to found this new idea," although only the beginning of the second sentence is visible in the photocopy provided.
Again, despite the Cuban authorities' claims that this evidence demonstrated a threat to national security and therefore warranted prosecution, the evidence in itself is not indicative of any obvious criminal activity, and cannot in itself justify the authorities' repressive reaction.

4.4. Sentencing

For many of the defendants, the prosecution called for the upper limit of the prescribed sanction. A number of defendants faced calls for life imprisonment, on the basis of 1999 revisions to the penal code:

The sanction of life imprisonment can be imposed as the principal sanction in crimes for which it is expressly provided or alternatively in those which provide for the death penalty.(96)

5. Individual case summaries: the faces of the dissident movement

The 75 dissidents caught up in the crackdown represent all facets of the dissident movement in Cuba. They include longtime activists, some well-known and some less so. Below are summaries, based on past Amnesty International work and the available information, of their backgrounds and involvement in the dissident movement. Where available, the summaries conclude with an overview of the accusations against them in the trial documents. The text box includes descriptions of some important initiatives in the recent history of peaceful dissent in Cuba, which may be helpful in tracing the activities of some of the individuals targeted in the crackdown.

The case summaries below have been arranged alphabetically. The 75 individuals described were all arrested in the March crackdown, and have subsequently been sentenced to harsh prison terms following summary trials. Amnesty International considers them to be prisoners of conscience, detained solely for the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms.

The information contained in these summaries is current as of this document going to print.

The Concilio Cubano, Cuban Council, was a forum of some 140 unofficial groups including human rights groups, political opposition groups, and groups of journalists, lawyers, women, young people, economists, engineers, ecologists and trade unionists. It was established in October 1995 to work for political change through peaceful means. Its aims included an amnesty for political prisoners; respect for the Constitution; fulfillment of Cuba's international human rights obligations; lifting of labour restrictions; and movement towards more free and open direct elections.(98)

Concilio Cubano members were subjected to a government crackdown in late 1995 and early 1996; a planned national meeting scheduled for 24 February 1996 was eventually banned by the authorities.(99) Scores of people were arbitrarily detained; though most were released shortly thereafter, four were sentenced to prison terms and were considered prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International.

The "Todos Unidos," "All Together" movement of dissident groups was formed in the runup to the 1999 Ibero-American Summit. Their Joint Declaration on the occasion of the Summit was, over the next years, signed by a growing number of individuals representing a significant number of dissident groups across the island. In March 2001, 117 "Todos Unidos" signatories issued a proclamation in favour of the Proyecto Varela referendum movement (see below), and "Todos Unidos" members were instrumental in gathering signatures and support for Proyecto Varela. In December 2002, the "Todos Unidos" movement released a series of Proposals for measures to resolve the crisis, including a range of economic, labour, social and legal measures to reform national life.

The Proyecto Varela is a petition for referendum on legal reform which seeks greater personal, political and economic freedoms, as well as amnesty for political prisoners. It is led by Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas, of the Movimiento Cristiano Liberación, Christian Liberation Movement, and signatures were collected by a broad range of organisations. In March 2002 project organisers reported having collected the 10,000 signatures constitutionally required to hold a referendum; these were submitted to the National Assembly. In December 2002 Oswaldo Payá received the European Union's top human rights award, the Sakharov Prize, named after the late Soviet dissident.

Activists for the Proyecto Varela have been subjected to threats, short-term detention, summons, confiscation of materials and other forms of harassment by State Security agents; several of the initiative's leaders were arrested in the recent roundup.

1. Nelson Alberto Aguiar Ramírez, aged 57, is president of the unofficial Partido Ortodoxo de Cuba, Cuba Orthodox Party, and a member of the recent initiative, Asamblea para Promover la Sociedad Civil, Assembly to Promote Civil Society. He is an electrician by profession, and has been involved in activities critical of the government for a number of years. In one example, in December 1999 he was detained during a mass arrest of dissidents aimed at preventing them from participating in celebrations commemorating the 10 December anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

He was