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Uncomfortable questions
regarding the inevitable succession of power
in Cuba
By Dr. Max G. Manwaring,
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.Army
War College. La
Nueva Cuba, September 1, 2004.
Four uncomfortable questions arise, even
in circumspect circles, regarding the possible
succession of power in Cuba. First, assuming
the nearly 80-year old FidelCastro is mortal,
"Who will succeed him when he dies?"
Second, "What role will the Cuban armed
forces play in the transition process?"
Third, "What could happen to disrupt
that process?" And, finally, "Will
the United States respond to the event in
an ad hoc manner, or will a plan be in place
to help ensure U.S. interests?" The
answers to the first two questions are relatively
easy, and constitute the mostlikely "business
as usual" transition scenario. That
is, Raul Castro will follow his brother
in an orderly, dynastic succession with
the support of a united military chain of
command. Raul has a strong claim to that
succession.
As already indicated, he is Fidel's brother
and heir apparent. Significantly, Raul is
also the long-time Cuban Defense Minister,
and has considerable military power at his
disposal. In this connection, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
[FAR]) has long been the most powerful,
influential, and competent governmental
institution in Cuba. Top generals will play
crucial roles in all conceivable succession
scenarios. So, what could gowrong?
Several scenarios could be developed, but,
for the purposes of this argument, we will
consider the two most discussed possibilities.
First, if large-scale internal popular violence-exacerbated
by anti-regime forces outside Cuba-were
to be mobilized, it is possible that some
military commanders might refuse to move
against civilians. Second, if Raul Castro
were to die before his older brother, the
expected succession would be thrown into
chaos. In both these scenarios, (1) institutional
integrity-military command and control-could
be fractured and a certain level of anarchy
would be encouraged; (2) various individuals
with viable political and/or military power
at their disposal could and would challenge
the system, and the best organized and best
armed leader would dominate a praetorian-type
regime; and (3) there is a high probability
of civil war.What, then, should U.S. planners
and leaders focus on that would be most
helpful inproactively preparing for or reacting
ad hoc to a situation involving the demise
or incapacitation of either Fidel or Raul
Castro?
The critical dependent variable in these
and many other transition scenarios that
might be developed is the degree to which
the institutional integrity of the FAR is
being enhanced-or being eroded. FAR's integrity,
in turn, will be determined by the cohesion,
singularity of purpose, professionalism,
popular support, and morale of its personnel-and
by the political and leadership skills of
the officer corps. Is the United States
researching, monitoring, and molding these
variables to provide maximum leverage for
the protection and enhancement of U.S.interests
in Cuba and the Caribbean region? Are the
additional dependent and independent variables
that contribute significantly to the greater
notion of the political, economic, and social
stability and security of Cuba being assessed?
Are the same things being done not only
to prevent Cuba from becoming a failed state,
but also to establish a responsible democratic
system in that country that will contribute
to the strengthening of democracy in the
region? These questions provide a task outline
of what planners and policymakers must accomplish
to respond intelligently and effectively
to Cuba's inevitable transition scenario.
The final question involves planning--more
specifically, end-state planning. Although
the United States and other global actors
might agree regarding Cuba's many interrelated
problems, how to deal with them in terms
of sequence and priority cannotbe left to
"ad-hoc-ery."
In this context, it is time to move beyond
a unilateral, crisis management approach
to the Cuban strategic problem as if it
were a strategy. A long-term multilateral
endgame strategy is required for Cuba in
which the United States is a key player.
If the United States is to protect and enhance
its interests in Cuba and the Caribbean
region it will be crucial to: (1) gather
the information that explains the key operative
variables in the Cuban situation; (2) determine
mutually-agreed interests with other players;
(3) establish an integrated multilateral
implementing strategy upheld by transparent,
achievable goals that can be used to evaluate
progress; and (4) develop the multilateral
organization that can implement a unified
strategy. The sooner, the better!
Copyright © 1997-2005
- LA NUEVA CUBA
All Rights Reserved.
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